to growing gas-based thermal power production. After the closure of Ignalina nuclear power plant in 2009, thermal power production based on natural gas is the most important source of electricity production in Lithuania. In addition, emissions from households and services increased due to colder winter months, compared to 2009. Finally, emissions from road transport and industry increased, reflecting the gradual economic recovery after strong decline in 2009. Average 2008-2011 emissions in Lithuania were 56.2 % lower than the base-year level, well below the Kyoto target of -8 % for the period of [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . In the sectors not covered by the EU ETS, emissions were significantly lower than their respective target, by an amount equivalent to 44 % of base-year emissions. Lithuania intends to use the flexible mechanisms at governmental level by selling an amount of Kyoto units equivalent to 28.6 % of base-year emissions per year. Taking all these effects into account, average emissions in the sectors not covered by the EU ETS in Lithuania were standing below their target level, by a gap representing 17.7 % of the base-year emissions. Lithuania was therefore on track towards its Kyoto target by the end of 2011. Though Lithuania does not have problems in implementing its Kyoto requirements, as the EU Member State it has to comply with EU commitments and follows the EU negotiation track with UNFCCC Secretariat for the second requirement of the Kyoto Protocol.
The most recent COP18 was held in 2012. 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol opened on Monday, 26 November, and continued until Saturday, 8 December 2012 at the Qatar National Convention Centre in Doha, Qatar. Some 17,000 official delegates from 194 nations attended the official summit at the Qatar National Convention Centre. The world's leading scientists, at least 1,500 journalists and thousands of NGO representatives participated in the conference. As this was an environmentally-friendly summit, carpooling and public transportation were encouraged. Some 400 busses will shuttle participants to and from the QNCC, and no private cars will be allowed into the Centre.
The COP18 in Doha focused on five aspects of climate change:
• Adaptation -social and other changes that must be undertaken to successfully adapt to climate change. Adaptation might encompass, but is not limited to, changes in agriculture and urban planning.
• Mitigation -steps and actions that the countries of the world can take to mitigate the effects of climate change.
• Finance -how countries will finance adaptation to and mitigation of climate change, whether from public or private sources.
• Technology -the technologies that are needed to adapt or mitigate climate change and ways in which developed countries can support developing countries in adopting them.
• Loss and damage -first articulated at the 2012 conference and in part based on the agreement that was signed at the 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun. The main objective of Doha from a procedural perspective was to streamline the negotiating process. Therefore, countries were seeking to conclude negotiations on a second Kyoto Protocol commitment period, terminate parallel Convention talks on how to enhance collective climate action by all countries, and give shape and direction to the new Durban Platform process for agreeing a new global climate treaty in 2015. On all three counts, COP 18 delivered significant results.
Though successful in general, the COP18 did not deliver any improvement in mitigation ambition on the part of major emitters. Going into the conference, all the major parties had clearly signaled that they were unlikely to move beyond current pledges. This was particularly true of the US, whose position effectively set a ceiling on ambition. The EU might have pushed the boundaries, but internal difficulties within the group meant that it was never likely to move up to its higher 30% target unilaterally. With the developed world unwilling to increase their targets, there was no incentive for China or India to raise theirs.
In practice this means that the Kyoto Protocol -still the only legally binding, quantified, international climate treaty does not provide for real results in climate change mitigation. The second Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2CP) will cover only 15% of the global emissions, with the 2020 target of the largest party (the EU) already effectively met. Collectively, the overall emission reduction will be approximately 18% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, significantly less than the 25-40% range recommended by climate scientists.
An opportunity to improve ambition by allowing access to the Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for those countries not taking 2CP commitments (i.e. the US, Japan, Canada, Russia and New Zealand) was also missed during COP18. If this were allowed, it could have provided an additional source of demand for CDM credits by financing mitigation efforts in developing countries and achieving greater results in GHG emission reduction.
The weak decision relating to the carryover of unused emission allowance units from the first commitment period (estimated to be around 13 billion units) was adopted in COP18. Many of these are the so-called 'hot-air' units, coming from former Sovietunion countries, including Lithuania. Their impact, however, will be mitigated by new limitations on the trading in these units and the fact that most of the 2 nd commitment period Parties, not least the EU, have stated that they will not purchase these units. Such a restriction will limit their use to the original holders joining the new commitment period, such as Poland and Ukraine. As negotiations proceed under the Durban Platform, the concern is that Russia (the main holder of hot air) and other countries may seek to roll their Kyoto surpluses into the new post-2020 climate deal.
The other weak outcome that emerged in COP18 underlined the critical role that progressive business and sub-national government leaders would need to play if global efforts to address climate change were to be raised over the coming three to five years. On the positive side, the package of decisions, dubbed the 'Doha Climate Gateway' , keep climate negotiations on track towards the new global climate deal in 2015. But the continuing lack of mitigation ambition from major emitters means that the window of opportunity for keeping global warming below 2 o C is closing rapidly. Despite all of these weaknesses, the COP18 did not close the door on greater climate action.
Attempts to strengthen carbon accounting rules for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) were also unsuccessful. This will make it difficult to assess the comparability of mitigation effort, particularly between those developed countries taking action under Kyoto and those who have made pledges under the Convention.
The previous COP17 in Durban saw some diplomatic success for the EU. The agreed so-called 'Durban Package' was more or less the minimum deal that Europe had sought going into the meeting. In Doha, the EU aimed to wrap up the outstanding issues contained in the Durban Package, and consolidate and simplify the ongoing negotiating process. Like of many other countries, Europe's three basic objectives are to: adopt an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that will implement a second commitment period from 1 January 2013; conclude the parallel Convention track negotiations on 'Long-Term Cooperative Action' and to start work on a new post-2020 global treaty and the means for raising ambition in the interim period, under the new Durban Platform process.
To achieve these goals, the EU will require a number of conditions to be met. For example, political support in Europe for a second Kyoto commitment period will require, in part, comparable commitments on emission reductions from the other major emitters. While the EU recognises that neither the US nor China will make Kyoto-style commitments in Doha, it will need to see some form of increased action on mitigation from the world's largest emitters as a sign of good faith. The EU was seeking greater ambition on the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) framework for mitigation action, so that all major emitters use comparable systems. A deal to restrict the carry-over of unused emission allowances from the first Kyoto commitment period in order to protect and raise the environmental integrity of actions beyond 2012 will also be critical to the EU.
As with any negotiation, the EU will need to give and receive if it wants the outcome it is seeking. Increasing its 2020 emission reduction target from 20% to 30% is the obvious card it has to play. Recent analysis conducted by EC concluded that the EU had already achieved its 20% reductions. Adopting the 30% target would make an important political statement in Doha, but could also be wasted, if unreciprocated by the likes of the US and China.
According to the Copenhagen Accord, a financing gap has opened up between the needs of developing countries and the availability of funds. The EU has so far given out €7.1 billion to finance climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in the least advanced countries and has nearly met its pledge to deliver €7.2 billion. But a more substantive gesture on climate finance is a key lever that the EU will need to consider. However, the economic crisis, the euro-crisis and weak economic growth mean there is far less political support in Europe for new public funding commitments, to make sure climate financing will continue to increase for poor countries after 2012. To sum up, the COP18 has the potential to advance the EU's climate action goals, but success -as always -will depend on a combination of EU leadership and reciprocated action from key partners.
Regarding mitigation, one of the most positive sides of COP18 was the fact that countries did manage to conclude negotiations on a new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as wrap up parallel talks on how to enhance collective climate action by all countries. This has left countries with a much streamlined, single track negotiation process from next year, focused on the Durban Platform process, which is meant to agree a new global climate treaty by 2015. Countries, however, failed to move beyond the emission reduction pledges that have been on the table since the Copenhagen conference in 2009. The net result is that Doha leaves the world firmly on track to 4 degrees or more of warming by 2100. Some important issues were simply ignored during COP18. For example, emissions from international aviation and maritime transport were a case in point. Although included in the earlier draft decisions, in the end the countries could not reach an agreement on how to deal with these sectors.
Regarding adaptation, the principle outcome on adaptation at COP18 was undoubtedly the decision to establish 'institutional arrangements' for some kind of 'Loss and Damage' mechanism at next year's COP. This is a major achievement for developing countries, particularly those most vulnerable to extreme and long-term impacts of climate change, such as small island states. These countries have been calling for such an instrument for many years. However, negotiations on this issue over the coming 12 months are unlikely to be any easier than they were in Doha. Developed countries, especially the US, wary about any arrangements that may institutionalise historic responsibility or legal liability for future climate impacts. A key question to be answered is how this mechanism will actually be funded. Given the low level of funds provided by developed countries for the Green Climate Fund, new financing sources could well be critical to the operation of the new Loss and Damage mechanism.
Regarding finance, this issue has been proved to be the most difficult one to resolve in Doha. No quantified, collective commitment was made, although a number of countries, i.e. UK, Germany, Sweden and France did come forward with individual pledges. A work programme on long-term finance was extended for a year to help advance ongoing discussions. Requests were also made to the financial institutions set up in recent years under the UNFCCC. The overall outcome on finance was disappointing for many developing countries. One reason for this is that hard-line position taken by developed countries in Doha underlined the very real political limits on public funding from these parties. The euro crisis, earthquake costs and slow economic growth have hit budgets of all the major donors hard, making climate aid a difficult sell to domestic audiences.
Regarding technology transfer, the intellectual property rights are crucial. The issue of intellectual property rights (IPR) was once again the main point of contention in Doha on technology. As with COP17, the issue did not make it into a final decision, it remained one of the principal redline issues for developed countries. Beyond the clash over IPR, the main focus of technology negotiations in Doha was providing further instructions to the two bodies that make up the Technology Mechanism established in Cancun in 2010. The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN) are intended to improve low carbon technology transfer to developing countries. The TEC provides broad policy advice while the CTCN focuses on implementation.
On the positive side in Doha, the agreement to further develop a new market mechanism and a framework for voluntary approaches underlined that countries -both developed and developing -recognise the value of these tools. Work programmes for both schemes have been established for 2013 'with a view' to making decisions at next year's COP that elaborate how the mechanism and framework will operate. The sharp drop has been driven by EU restrictions on the use of CDM carbon offset credits and general oversupply of carbon allowances in Europe's emissions trading scheme.
The failure to extend access to the CDM to Parties not participating in Kyoto's 2 nd commitment periods -a key recommendation of a high level expert panel earlier this year -is also damaging. Since its establishment, the mechanism has driven $215 billion
